Electronic Visual Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment: The Arrival of Big Brother by Hodges, David P.
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly
Volume 3
Number 1 Winter 1976 Article 9
1-1-1976
Electronic Visual Surveillance and the Fourth
Amendment: The Arrival of Big Brother
David P. Hodges
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation




AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: THE
ARRIVAL OF BIG BROTHER?
By David P. Hodges*
I. Introduction
On February 8, 1974, Paul Castellano was holding a meeting in his
office with -three business associates. Apparently suspecting the group
of involvement in organized crime, agents of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation were using a hidden listening device to monitor the meet-
ing and were also watching the group's activities by means of a televi-
sion camera which they had secretly installed in the office. During the
meeting Castellano suddenly discovered the listening device. As the
agents watched on their television monitor, the men conducted a thor-
ough search for other devices. The agents' view ended abruptly when
the camera was discovered and smashed. Shortly thereafter, the agents
entered the office. Unable to find the listening device, -they arrested the
four men for theft of government owned property.'
In an editorial referring to this incident, the New York Times
commented that "it is an Orwellian act of official arrogance to assign
inviolable status as government property to the instruments of clandes-
tine intrusion on a citizen's office or home,"2 and asked: "Must the
target of a wiretap adjust to the bug as constant companion? Is it a
must to stay on camera?" The editorial conceded, however, that "pre-
sumably the equipment was installed by the F.B.I. with court sanc-
tion." The latter comment provides the focus for this note: May a
court constitutionally authorize the installation of clandestine electronic
visual surveillance devices for law enforcement purposes?
A carefully circumscribed statutory procedure has been established
under which wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping are permitted for
law enforcement purposes when conducted in accordance with prior
* Member, second year class.
1. N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1974, at 35, col. 1.
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judicial authorization. 5 The listening device installed in Mr. Castel-
lano's office, if authorized and operated in the manner prescribed by this
statute, was therefore a constitutionally permissible investigative tool.6
However, the statute does not apply to the use of a hidden camera to spy
on the activities of individuals, 7 nor has the Supreme Court ever consid-
ered the constitutionality of the use of such a device." Nevertheless, the
Castellano incident illustrates that "electronic snooping ' 9 is now emerg-
ing as a tool of law enforcement. This development raises some serious
constitutional questions involving the conflict between the legitimate
need of society for effective law enforcement and the right of the
individual members of society to be free from unreasonable governmen-
tal intrusions.'"
The individual's "right of privacy" is a cherished value of Ameri-
can society. Yet the meaning of privacy varies depending on the factual
context and the expectations of the individual concerned. Privacy has
been defined, for example, as the right "to be let alone,"" the right of
persons "to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent
information about them is communicated to others,"' and as the right
5. Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18
U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970) [hereinafter referred to in text and notes as Title Ill]. See
notes 107-116 infra and text accompanying.
6. The constitutionality of Title III has not been directly considered by the
Supreme Court, but has been upheld by all of the federal courts of appeals that have
considered the issue. See, e.g., United States v. Sklaroff, 506 F.2d 837 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 96 S. Ct. 142 (1975), and cases cited therein at 840.
7. Title III applies only to the "aural acquisition of the contents of any wire or
oral communication .... ." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1970) (emphasis added). See S.
REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 90 (1968) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]
(other forms of surveillance not within the proposed legislation).
8. Research has revealed only one case that mentions the use of a hidden camera
by law enforcement agents. In Sponick v. Police Dep't, 49 Mich. App. 162, 211 N.W.2d
674 (1973), F.B.I. agents concealed a camera in the wall of a bar to watch for suspected
gambling activity. Since the bar was a public place, the court held that the use of the
camera was not a search under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 198, 211 N.W.2d at 690.
See notes 69-75 infra and text accompanying.
9. The use of electronic devices for the purpose of visual surveillance will
hereinafter be referred to as "electronic snooping," as distinguished from the use of
electronic devices for the purpose of aural surveillance (including both wiretapping and
bugging), which will hereinafter be referred to as "electronic eavesdropping." The term
"electronic surveillance" will refer to both of these and to any other electronic methods
for clandestine surveillance of persons. See, e.g., United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859
(5th Cir. 1975) ("beeper" attached to car for constant surveillance of car's location);
United States v. Martyniuk, 395 F. Supp. 42 (D. Or. 1975) (same).
10. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1968); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523, 528, 533 (1967); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 363-65 (1959).
11. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193, 205 (1890).
12. A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967) [hereinafter cited as WESrlN].
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which protects "the individual's interest in preserving his essential dignity
as a human being."' 3  The Supreme Court has held that there is a
constitutional right of privacy which absolutely prohibits governmental
interference in certain areas of individual activity. 4 But the Fourth
Amendment contains no general right to privacy absolutely prohibiting
governmental intrusion;15 rather, it protects only against "unreasona-
ble" governmental intrusions. 1' The primary constitutional question
posed by electronic snooping is whether there are circumstances under
which the invasion of privacy which it entails can be considered reasona-
ble and thus permissible under the Fourth Amendment.
The question of the protection of individual privacy has come into
sharper focus since the elctronic age has expanded the means by which
searches and seizures may be accomplished. The drafters of the Fourth
Amendment were concerned only with the permissible scope of a physi-
cal entry into a person's home or business and the seizure of physical
objects. That "zone of privacy" which protected spoken words from
overhearing and acts from observation was fixed by the inherent limits
of the human senses. Privacy against prying eyes and ears could be
insured when such privacy was desired. The advent of electronics,
however, has eliminated the traditional zone of privacy with respect to
one's spoken words since eavesdropping devices can detect what is said
virtually anywhere.
Members of the Supreme Court, recognizing the impact on tradi-
.tional notions of privacy of the "frightening paraphernalia which the
vaunted marvels of an electronic age may visit upon human society,"'
7
have long expressed their apprehension over the predictable improve-
ments in sophistication of such devices. In his famous dissent in the
first wiretapping case considered by the Court, Justice Brandeis warned
that "[t]he progress of science in furnishing the Government with
13. Hufstedler, The Directions and Misdirections of a Constitutional Right of
Privacy, 26 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 546, 550 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Hufstedler].
See generally Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968).
14. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (individual decision to have an
abortion); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (possession of obscene materials in
the home); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (use of contraceptives by
married persons). A similar right has been recognized by state courts. E.g., State v.
Bateman, 25 Ariz. App. 1, 540 P.2d 732 (1975) (consenting sexual behavior by a mar-
ried couple in private); Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alas. 1975) (possession of mari-
juana for personal use in the home).
15. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967).
16. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147 (1925).
17. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509 (1961).
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means of espionage is not likely to stop with wire-tapping."' 8  Justice
Murphy foresaw that "new methods of photography that penetrate walls
or overcome distances" would be "far more effective devices for the
invasion of a person's privacy than the direct and obvious methods of
oppression which were detested by our forebears. . . ."I' Chief Jus-
tice Warren referred to the danger posed by "the fantastic advances in
the field of electronic communication .... -20 Justice Douglas ex-
pressed his concern that "[w]e are rapidly entering the age of no pri-
vacy, where everyone is open to surveillance at all times .... -21
These apprehensions have been realized by the development of
electronic snooping devices, which now threaten to eliminate the barrier
against visual intrusion upon an individual's traditional zone of privacy.
The implications of electronic snooping are far more serious -than those
of electronic eavesdropping. 2 For this reason it is imperative that
electronic snooping not be considered merely an extension of electronic
eavesdropping, to be utilized in law enforcement subject to no greater
constitutional or statutory restrictions. As an inherently more intrusive
surveillance technique, electronic snooping must be separately evaluated
against the constitutionally mandated standard of reasonableness.
Compelling reasons require that the legal community address this
issue now, before the official use of electronic snooping becomes wide-
spread. A time delay invariably exists between the introduction of a
new technology and judicial consideration of its constitutional implica-
tions 3.2  Recent technological progress, particularly in the field of elec-
tronics, has resulted in "a drastic acceleration of the process of innova-
tion, invention and practical application of new technology. '24  Conse-
quently this time delay has taken on increased significance where new
18. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing).
19. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 139 (1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
20. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 441 (1963) (Warren, C.J., concurring in
the result).
21. Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 341 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
22. "When-and this may be in the not-too-distant future-walls cease to be a
barrier to visual aids, it will be the visual eavesdropper who poses the greatest threat to
the right of privacy." Comment, Electronic Eavesdropping: A New Approach, 52
CALIF. L. REV. 142, 147 (1964).
23. See generally Green, The New Technological Era: A View From the Law,
BULL. OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, Nov. 1967, at 12.
24. Green, Technology Assessment and the Law: Introduction and Perspective, 36
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1033, 1034 (1968). For specific examples, see references cited in
note 34 infra.
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electronic surveillance techniques are concerned.' 5  By the time Con-
gress acted to bring electronic eavesdropping under statutory control,
the technology had been in widespread use for many years.2 6 A total
ban on electronic eavesdropping, although proposed,27 would have
been unrealistic and probably unworkable under the circumstances.
Electronic snooping, on the other hand, is not yet in widespread
use. Effective regulation of its use in law enforcement is therefore
possible. Now is the critical time to ask whether the use of electronic
snooping as a law enforcement tool should be permitted under any
circumstances. This note will examine the constitutionality of electronic
snooping techniques which intrude upon an individual's "reasonable
expectation of privacy"28 protected by the Fourth Amendment to the
Constitution. The discussion will proceed by analogy to .the constitu-
tional principles relating to electronic eavesdropping, 29 taking into ac-
count relevant differences between the two techniques. It is appropriate
to begin this inquiry with an examination of the exact nature of the
technology of electronic snooping and its present and future capabilities.
25. 'Technological developments are arriving so rapidly and are changing the
nature of our society so fundamentally that we are in danger of losing the capacity to
shape our own destiny.
"This danger is particularly ominous when the new technology is designed for
surveillance purposes, for in this case the tight relationship between technology and
power is most obvious. Control over the technology of surveillance conveys effective
control over our privacy, our freedom and our dignity-in short, control over the most
meaningful aspects of our lives as free human beings." Hearings on Surveillance
Technology Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., June 23, 1975 (opening statement of Senator Tunney)
(mimeographed copy obtained from Senator Tunney's office). 'The law, though
jealous of individual privacy, has not kept pace with [the] advances in scientific knowl-
edge." Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 49 (1967). "[O]ur course of decisions, it
now seems, has been outflanked by the technological advances of the very recent past."
Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 471 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
26. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 45-47 (1967).
27. S. 928, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) (Right of Privacy Act of 1967). See
generally SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 161-62 (individual views of Senator Long and
Senator Hart).
28. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). See
notes 69-75 infra and text accompanying.
29. Electronic snooping is more closely analogous to electronic eavesdropping than
to an ordinary physical entry because it involves the same electronic extension of the
unaided senses, the same lack of presearch notice, and normally the same kind of search
for evidence from the acts of the suspect himself rather than from the seizure of a
specific tangible object which may be found in the place searched. But see note 125
infra and text accompanying. Thus the constitutional issues raised by electronic snoop-
ing are most logically approached by analogy to the law relating to electronic eaves-
dropping.
Winter 19761 ELECTRONIC VISUAL SURVEILLANCE
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
H0. The Tools
A. Miniature Television Cameras
The potential usefulness of hidden television cameras to view areas
otherwise inaccessible to unaided visual perception has long been recog-
nized. 0 Writers have described visual surveillance systems consisting
of cameras installed between walls and fitted with a ninety-degree
mirror to observe the adjoining room,31 mounted on a telephone pole to
look into apartment windows across the street,3 2 and placed in the
ventilators of public restrooms to detect and apprehend homosexuals. 3
But these systems have not been widely used for visual surveillance
of private areas since they generally lacked portability and were diffi-
cult to install, conceal and maintain.
These problems have been virtually eliminated by the introduction
of cameras equipped with a very recently developed solid-state image
sensor called a "charge-coupled device" (CCD).34  Currently about the
size of a nickel, the CCD replaces the bulky and expensive tubes which
were previously the heart of a television camera. The development of
the first complete closed-circuit camera system using CCD technology
was announced in 1973.11 The camera was hand-held, measured
three inches by two inches by one inch and weighed six ounces. Only
one month later a considerably more sophisticated sensor was un-
veiled," and early in 1975 a camera became available which incor-
30. See, e.g., WESTiN, supra note 12, at 71-72; S. DASH, R. SCHWARTZ, & R.
KNOWLTON, THE EAVESDROPPERS 375-78 (1959) [hereinafter cited as DASH].
31. Sanford, TV for Surveillance, LAw AND ORDER, Dec. 1964, at 16.
32. Shaw, An Introduction to Law Enforcement Electronics and Communications,
Part III, LAw AND ORDER, May 1965, at 36.
33. WEmNt, supra note 12, at 131.
34. See generally Amelio, Charge-Coupled Devices, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, Feb.
1974, at 22; Gilmore, Tiny TV Camera With a Big Future, PoPuitAR Sc., Aug. 1972, at
28. The CCD is the latest product of the burgeoning semiconductor electronics industry,
which, although less than thirty years old, has already had a remarkable impact on
society. For a glimpse of the speed with which the industry is inventing and improving
new electronic devices, compare Vacroux, Microcmputers, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, May
1975, at 32, with Hittinger & Sparks, Microelectronics, ScIENTF IC AMERiCAN, Nov.
1965, at 57. CCD technology may similarly be expected to undergo rapid development,
leading to greatly improved sophistication and further reduction in size.
35. N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1973, at 54, col: 1; Bus. WEEK. Aug. 25, 1973, at 21.
36. N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1973, at 68, col. 4. "Sophistication" in this sense refers
to the sensor's resolution, image quality, and light-gathering efficiency, which are
dependent upon the number of independent "elements" (literally, "eyes") contained in
each sensor. The original CCD contained 10,000 elements; the later device contained




porated this sensor and was fully compatible with existing television
monitors, videotape recorders and other equipment.
3 7
Such miniaturized cameras can easily be concealed in a briefcase, a
kitchen cabinet, a lamp base, a room heating duct, an overhead lighting
fixture or even in an electrical outlet or light switch. One writer has
predicted the development of wireless, battery-powered electronic "eyes"
as small as buttons. 38  This prospect seems assured with the advent of
CCD technology. Thus the capability currently exists to gain visual
access to virtually any private area, in a manner similar to the use of
miniature listening devices -to overhear private conversations.39
B. Light Pipes
Another recent development which can be utilized in conjunction
with miniature television cameras is the technology of "fiber optics."40
This technology employs a small bundle of thin, transparent and flexible
fibers called a "light pipe" which can conduct light or visual images
from one end of the bundle to the other even when the fibers are twisted
or completely coiled up. At one end of the pipe is a lens and at the
other a television camera, which can be located at a convenient distance
from the area under surveillance. Only the lens need actually intrude
into the target area, and its presence can be easily concealed. There are
few places into which an expertly installed light pipe cannot intrude.
Any installation difficulties attending the use of television cameras for
surveillance would thus be eliminated.
C. Low Light Level Television
Another facet of a comprehensive electronic snooping system is the
ability to virtually "see in the dark." One means by which this may be
accomplished is 'through the technology of Low Light Level Television
(LLLTV),41 which utilizes an extremely sensitive visual detector. An
37. N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1975, at 48, col. 4.
38. WEsTiN, supra note 12, at 86.
39. See generally DASH, supra note 30, at 330-58. One difference between visual
and aural "bugs," of course, is that the visual device must be in plain sight in the area
under surveillance. Nevertheless, appropriate camouflage techniques can be employed to
minimize the risk of inadvertent detection.
40. See generally Goldberg, Fiber Optics, POPULAR PHOTOGRAPHY, Nov. 1971, at
100.
41. See generally Norwood, "Available Dark" Photography, INDusmmi PHOTOG-
RAPH, Nov. 1971, at 24 (describing the development of LLLTV technology for use in
Vietnam, and its conversion to domestic law enforcement purposes upon declassification
of information about the system).
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area which appears dark to the naked eye can be viewed on a television
screen as if in bright daylight by the use of such systems. Under grants
from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, LLLTV systems
have been installed in several cities to provide remote surveillance of
downtown business areas in an effort to reduce street crime and better
utilize police resources. 42  With the development of charge-coupled
devices incorporating low light level capabilities, 4 electronic snooping
systems can now provide surveillance of enclosed areas under any
conceivable lighting conditions. No longer is darkness a barrier to an
electronic snooper.
D. Infrared Television Cameras
Another method of "seeing in the dark" involves the use of devices
which detect infrared radiation.4 Originally developed for night vision
use by the military, these devices now have been adapted for civilian
purposes.45 The earlier models utilized the "direct viewing" system, in
which invisible infrared radiation illuminates the area under observation
and the reflections are detected by a television camera sensitive to such
radiation, just as visible radiation is detected by an ordinary camera.46 A
more sophisticated method uses the "thermal imaging" system, which
directly detects infrared radiation and converts it into electrical energy.
47
By discriminating between the minute differences in temperature of
various parts of the body, this system can produce a high-resolution black
and white television image of a person, including all facial details, at a
distance of several hundred yards, even on an overcast night or through
dense fog.
Although -these infrared sensors can be used in miniature television
cameras as an alternative to the LLLTV technique, the most signficant
42. See generally Donner, Political Intelligence: Cameras, Informers, and Files, 1
CIv. LIB. REv. 8, 13 (1974); Note, Police Use of Remote Camera Systems for
Surveillance of Public Streets, 4 COLUM. HuMAN RIGHTS L. REv. 143-53 (1972).
43. See generally Cares & Kosonocky, Sensitivity and Resolution of Charge-
Coupled imagers at Low Light Levels, 33 RCA REV. 607 (1972).
44. Infrared radiation may be more familiarly described as heat. For example,
because of its warmth the human body emits infrared radiation. Although not visible to
the human eye, such radiation can be detected by appropriate electronic devices.
45. See, e.g., THE ENGINEER, July 5, 1973, at 23 (describing an infrared surveil-
lance system for security against intruders).
46. See Swift & Thompson, Seeing in the Dark, 42 THE RADMO AND ELECTRONIC
ENGINEER 403 (1972). A drawback of this system was that if the person being observed
also possessed an infrared detector he could detect the presence of the viewer and guard
against it.
47. See Id. at 408.
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feature of infrared technology is that eventually it may provide a means
to literally see through walls. Most present building materials, such as
wood and brick, are as opaque -to infrared radiation as they are to visible
light. However, certain substances in widespread use, such as plastics,
are excellent transmitters of infrared energy even when painted and thus
opaque to visible light.48  To a lesser extent glass and derivative materi-
als such as fiberglass also transmit infrared radiation. The day may
soon arrive when the infrared emanations from a human body, passing
through the four walls which have traditionally afforded privacy from
visual intrusions, can be detected and reconstructed into a television
picture by a nearby snooper. Such a development would remove the
last barrier to unwanted visual observation of private areas.
E. Videophones
One other means of visual intrusion, the videophone, deserves brief
attention. The videophone is an ordinary telephone incorporating a
television camera and viewing screen which permit the parties to a
conversation to see each other while they talk. Although their develop-
ment has not been as rapid as originally predicted, 49 videophones may
eventually become commonplace in private homes and businesses.50 In
a manner analogous to present methods of wiretapping,51 an electronic
snooper equipped with a television monitor could intercept both the
visual images and the oral communications of the parties to a video-
phone conversation.52
m1. Is Electronic Snooping A Search?
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon prob-
able cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched, and the persons or things -to be
seized.
48. Cf. WEsTrN, supra note 12, at 71 (describing wall panels made of a special
substance which transmits infrared).
49. See Hardeman, When Will Picturephone Break Out?, ELECTRONICS, Nov. 8,
1971, at 97.
50. A major step toward the mass production of a low cost, reliable videophone
may be the recent development of a CCD for use in videophones. See N.Y. Times, Jan.
4, 1975, at 29, col. 4.
51. See generally DASH, supra note 30, at 306-30.
52. Interception of the visual portion of the communication is not presently
prohibited. See note 7 supra.
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In determining the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to a
particular type of official conduct, two questions must be considered:
1. Does the conduct constitute a search or seizure within the
meaning of the amendment?
2. Is the conduct unreasonable? 3
Only if both of -these questions are answered in the affirmative will the
conduct constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
A. The Original Trespass Doctrine
The Supreme Court long ago declared that the protection of the
Fourth Amendment applies "to all invasions on the part of the govern-
ment and its employ6s of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies
of life." 55  Notwithstanding the breadth of this language, the terms
"search" and "seizure" were originally limited to an actual physical
trespass into a person's dwelling or place of business and to the seizure
of tangible objects.5 6 With the increasingly prevalent use of electronic
eavesdropping, however, came the realization that wiretapping and bug-
ging intruded upon the privacies of life protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment just as effectively as did the more traditional physical entry into the
home. When an actual physical trespass occurred, the Court was quick
to find a Fourth Amendment violation even though only conversations
had been "seized." 57 The Court soon explicitly held that conversation,
although an intangible, could be the subject of Fourth Amendment
53. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-20 (1968); Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 621-22 (1886).
54. The consequence of a Fourth Amendment violation is that no evidence thus
obtained is admissible in a state or federal criminal prosecution. Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961) (state prosecution); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)
(federal prosecution). But see United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975) (extension
of exclusionary rule not retroactively applied); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338
(1974) (refusing to extend the exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings); Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 412-24 (1971) (Burger, C.i., dissenting)
(questioning the wisdom of continued adherence to the exclusionary rule).
55. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
56. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). In Olmstead the use of a
wiretap to overhear the defendant's phone conversations was held not to constitute a
search because there was no physical entry into a protected area and because the
protection of the Fourth Amendment did not extend to intangibles such as conversation.
Id. at 464-65. See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942) (no search where
listening device was placed against defendant's hotel room wall).
57. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961). In Silrerman a "spike mike"
penetrated into the suspect's premises and contacted a heating duct, allowing the officers
to hear conversations throughout the house. Id. at 506-07.
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protection.5" Th illogic of continued adherence to the trespass doc-
trine was obvious, since the privacy interest invaded by electronic eaves-
dropping on conversations is the same whether or not a trespass has
been committed.59
Meanwhile, a similar development was occurring with regard to
visual observations by law enforcement officers. Following the maxim
that the eye cannot commit a search,6" the Court originally held that
observation of activity in the "open fields" with the unaided eye is not
within the protection of the Fourth Amendment.6 1  This led to the
development of the "plain view" doctrine: whenever a law enforcement
officer is in a position where he has a right to be, and sees instrumentali-
ties or fruits of crime, contraband or "mere evidence"62 in plain view, it
is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment for him to seize such
items.63 The doctrine applies even when officers use visual aids to
extend the normal capability of the human eye. Thus the use of a
flashlight at night to see what would have been visible to the naked eye
during the day has been held not to constitute a search. 64 Similarly,
observations made by the use of binoculars do not constitute a Fourth
Amendment search.65 When the officers made their observations dur-
ing an unauthorized trespass onto the curtilage of an individual's prop-
erty, however, a Fourth Amendment violation was found even though
58. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963).
59. "[T]he invasion of privacy is as great in one case as in the other." Silverman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512-13 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring).
60. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454 (1948).
61. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
62. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
63. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464-73 (1971) (plurality opinion);
Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968). See, e.g., Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23,
43 (1963). In Coolidge it is stated that the viewing must be "inadvertent," but as this
was the opinion of only a plurality of the Court, other courts, depending on the
circumstances of the case, have sometimes held that "inadvertence" is not required. E.g.,
State v. Pontier, 95 Idaho 707, 518 P.2d 969 (1974). See, e.g., Weaver v. Williams, 509
F.2d 884 (4th Cir. 1975) (officer stepped onto axle of truck in order to see over siding):
"'Plain view' in this context means whatever can be seen, whether accidentally or by
intentional scrutiny." Id. at 886. See generally Mascolo, The Role of Functional
Observation in the Law of Search and Seizure: A Study in Misconception, 71 DIcK. L.
REV. 379 (1967).
64. E.g., United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927); United States v. Booker, 461
F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1972). Contra, Pruitt v. State, 389 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. Crim. App.
1965).
65. E.g., United States v. Grimes, 426 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1970); Fullbright v.
United States, 392 F.2d 432 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 830 (1968); cf. On Lee
v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 754 (1952) (dictum). But see People v. Ciochon, 23 Ill.
App. 3d 363, 319 N.E.2d 332 (1974) (remanded on question of whether a reasonable
expectation of privacy from binocular observation was exhibited).
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no tangible objects were seized. 66 Again, with respect to visual observa-
tions the illogic of the trespass doctrine is apparent. The same privacy
interest is invaded whether the observation is made during a trespass
or by extrasensory means without the necessity of a trespass.
B. A "Reasonable Expectation of Privacy"
In Berger v. New York 67 the Court explicitly held that the use of
electronic devices to capture conversation is a search within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment, without making reference to any trespass on
the part of the electronic device into a "constitutionally protected area."6 8
Shortly thereafter, in Katz v. United States,69 the Court repudiated the
trespass doctrine and returned to a focus on privacy as the primary
determinant of whether a Fourth Amendment search and seizure had
occurred.
In Katz the bugging of a telephone booth in order to overhear the
suspect's side of phone conversations was held a violation of the Fourth
Amendment in the absence of prior judicial authorization even though
the listening device did not trespass into the phone booth. Holding that
the Fourth Amendment "protects people, not places,"7 0 and extends to
"the recording of oral statements" as well as to "the seizure of tangible
items,"''7 the Court concluded that "the reach of that Amendment
cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into
any given enclosure."7 2 By entering the phone booth and closing the
door, the defendant exhibited a "reasonable expectation of privacy"73 in
his conversations. The bugging constituted a search and seizure under
the Fourth Amendment because it "violated the privacy upon which
[Katz] justifiably relied while using the telephone booth....
The present test for determining when official conduct constitutes a
66. E.g., California v. Hurst, 325 F.2d 891, 898 (9th Cir. 1963); McGinnis v.
United States, 227 F.2d 598, 603 (1st Cir. 1955); Brock v. United States, 223 F.2d 681,
685 (5th Cir. 1955); see Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963)
(dictum); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 453 (1948). The plain view
doctrine is not applicable in such cases because the officer is not positioned where he has
a right to be. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-66 (1971) (plurality
opinion).
67. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
68. Id. at 51.
69. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
70. Id. at 351.
71. Id. at 353.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
74. Id. at 353.
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search or seizure is most clearly stated in Justice Harlan's concurrence in
Katz:
My understanding of the rule.., is that there is a twofold require-
ment, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that
society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable." Thus a man's
home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy,
but objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the "plain
view" of outsiders are not "protected" because no intention to
keep them to himself has been exhibited. On the other hand, con-
versations in the open would not be protected against being over-
heard, for -the expectation of privacy under the circumstances
would be unreasonable.
75
C. Application to Electronic Snooping
The Katz decision does not affect the "plain view" doctrine because
no one can have a reasonable expectation of privacy in an activity which
can be viewed by the unaided senses of others.76 But when a person
75. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). A possible interpretation of this language
is that whenever an actual expectation of privacy is absent, there is no Fourth
Amendment search. One commentator has observed that if this interpretation is taken
literally, "the government could diminish each person's subjective expectation of privacy
merely by announcing half-hourly on television that 1984 was being advanced by a
decade and that we were all forthwith being placed under comprehensive electronic
surveillance." Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. Rv.
349, 384 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Amsterdam]. At least one court has suggested
this very method of eliminating an actual expectation of privacy. State v. Bryant, 287
Minn. 205, 211, 177 N.W.2d 800, 804 (1970) (store could eliminate expectation of
privacy in public toilet stall by posting signs warning users of possible surveillance). See
Comment, 55 MINN. L. Rv. 1255 (1971); cf. United States v. Bynum, 485 F.2d 490,
501 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S. 903 (1974) (expectation of
privacy could be eliminated by suspect's awareness that his phone was tapped); People
v. Superior Court (Stroud), 37 Cal. App. 3d 836, 839, 112 Cal. Rptr. 764, 765 (1974)
(no expectation of privacy from helicopter observation when the area was the subject of
a regular air patrol). But cf. United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 905 (9th Cir. 1973)
(expectation of privacy in airline carry-on luggage not diminished by frequency of
intrusions). "Fortunately, neither Katz nor the fourth amendment asks what we expect
of government. They tell us what we should demand of government." Amsterdam,
supra, at 384. This note will assume that an actual expectation of privacy from
electronic snooping could not be defeated in the manner suggested by a literal reading of
Justice Harlan's phraseology.
76. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). A
number of courts have held, in effect, that no expectation of privacy existed if there was
any way in which a skillful and determined snooper could intrude using only his unaided
senses. The burden is placed on the victim of the intrusion to guard his privacy against
any conceivable invasion lest he lose it. E.g., United States v. Vilhotti, 323 F. Supp.
425, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); People v. Becker, 533 P.2d 494, 496 (Colo. 1975); Common-
wealth v. Hernley, 216 Pa. Super. 177, 181, 263 A.2d 904, 907 (1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 914 (1971). This approach has produced vigorous criticism in light of the growing
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takes reasonable steps to insure the actual privacy of his activity against
visual intrusion, an invasion of that privacy which can only be accom-
plished by electronic means must be considered a search under the
Fourth Amendment. Under the pre-Katz trespass doctrine, observa-
tions as well as conversations which were "seized" by means of an
unlawful trespass were suppressed as having been obtained in violation
of the Fourth Amendment.77 The development of highly sophisticated
electronic listening devices prompted the Court to declare that their use
to capture conversation was a search regardless of whether a trespass
had occurred.7 Even in the absence of the Katz decision, the develop-
ment of equally sophisticated electronic viewing devices would logically
have led to the same result when observations were accomplished by the
use of such devices.
Although Katz involved the specific problem of electronic eaves-
dropping, its explanation of a reasonable expectation of privacy was not
so limited:
What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.
But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible
to the public, may be constitutionally protected. 9
Furthermore, Justice Harlan's statement that activities exposed to plain
view are excluded from Fourth Amendment protection 0 implies that
activities not so exposed would be protected from observation.
Numerous other authorities recognize that the Fourth Amendment
sophistication of the means of intrustion. "Is it not important to our American way of
life that when a citizen does as much as ordinary care requires to shield his sanctuary
from strangers his constitutional right to maintain his privacy should not be made to
depend upon the resources of skillful peepers and eavesdroppers who can always find
ways to intrude?" United States v. Wright, 449 F.2d 1355, 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(Wright, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 947 (1972). After an extensive analysis
of the cases dealing with plain view observations, one writer concludes that the result is
"the specter of a fourth amendment which protects any man ... who is wealthy enough
to afford a windowless, soundproof house, built on an extensive area of land, and
surrounded by high fences, and ... who is willing to live the life of a hermit, staying
inside his house at all times, prepared to take affirmative action to counter any new
technological methods of intrusion with which the government might be equipped." Note,
Katz and the Fourth Amendment: A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy or, A Man's
Home Is HiL Fort, 23 CLEvE. ST. L. REv. 63, 72 (1974). See Amsterdam, supra note
75, at 402; Comment, Police Helicopter Surveillance, 15 ARIz. L. REv. 145, 167 (1973);
Comment, Constitutional Standards for Applying the Plain View Doctrine, 6 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 725, 736, 741 (1974).
77. See notes 57-58, 66 supra and text accompanying.
78. See text accompanying note 68 supra.
79. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967) (citations omitted).
80. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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may protect an individual's activities from unwanted observation by
electronic devices. 8 ' Absent prior judicial authorization, a camera lens
which can view an area otherwise inaccessible to observation is not
positioned where it has a right to be so that the plain view doctrine
might apply. 2 The conclusion is inescapable: electronic snooping must
be considered a search subject to the limitations imposed by the Fourth
Amendment when it intrudes into an area where a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy from observation exists. The next question to be consid-
ered, therefore, is whether electronic snooping can meet the standard of
reasonableness prescribed by the Fourth Amendment.
IV. The Warrant Requirement and Electronic Snooping
A. Reasonableness and the Warrant Requirement
The judicial determination of Fourth Amendment reasonableness
turns, "at least in part, on the more specific commands of the warrant
clause." 3 In general, "searches conducted outside the judicial process,
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment ... ."8' It does not follow, however,
that if a search has been authorized by a technically proper warrant
it is automatically reasonable. 85 The Fourth Amendment's two clauses
81. "While the Katz case involved evidence obtained by listening and the case
before us involves evidence obtained by visual observation, we think the results are the
same." State v. Bryant, 287 Minn. 205, 210, 177 N.W.2d 800, 803 (1970). See People
v. Spinelli, 35 N.Y.2d 77, 81n., 315 N.E.2d 792, 794n., 358 N.Y.S.2d 743, 747n. (1974)
(recognition that a "technologically aided viewing" might in itself constitute a "constitu-
tionally cognizable search"); Amsterdam, supra note 75, at 404; Knox, Some Thoughts
on the Scope of the Fourth Amendment and Standing to Challenge Searches and
Seizures, 40 Mo. L. Rav. 1, 17-18 (1975); Rehnquist, Is an Expanded Right of Privacy
Consistent With Fair and Effective Law Enforcement? Or: Privacy, You've Come a
Long Way, Baby, 23 U. KANS. L. RnV. 1, 4 (1974) (freedom from observation part of
the "core" concept of privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment).
82. See note 63 supra and text accompanying.
83. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 315 (1972).
84. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). See Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
Under certain conditions involving "exigent circumstances" making it unnecessary or un-
reasonable to obtain a warrant before conducting a search, prior judicial approval is un-
necessary. The Court in Katz discounted the idea that any of these exceptions could
apply to electronic eavesdropping. 389 U.S. at 357-58. The present discussion will
make the same assumption as to electronic snooping. But see 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7)
(1970), permitting electronic eavesdropping subject to subsequent judicial ratification
within 48 hours in cases of emergency situations involving conspiratorial activities
threatening national security or characteristic of organized crime.
85. Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 350 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting),
citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) ("a validly executed warrant does not
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are to a certain extent independent. The first prohibits all unreason-
able searches and seizures, and the second states the elements required
for a valid warrant.86 The present inquiry will consider these two
clauses separately. The warrant requirement will first be discussed by
analogy to the requirements for electronic eavesdropping orders. The
general standard of reasonableness will then be applied to a judicial
order for electronic snooping.
B. Constitutional Standards for Electronic Eavesdropping:
Berger and Katz
In Berger v. New York" the Court considered the constitutionality
of a New York statute which permitted electronic eavesdropping by law
enforcement officers under specified conditions. The statute authorized
a judge to issue an eavesdropping order upon oath or affirmation of an
appropriate official stating the existence of reasonable ground to believe
that evidence of crime would be obtained thereby, and particularly
describing the persons whose conversations were to be overheard and
the telephone number involved. The eavesdrop was limited to a two
month period unless extended."8
Relying in part on the circumstances surrounding the judicially
authorized use of an electronic recording device approved in Osborn v.
United States, 9 the Court in Berger held the New York statute unconsti-
tutional for the following reasons:
necessarily make legal the ensuing search and seizure"). See, e.g.. Bowden v. State, 510
S.W.2d 879 (Ark. 1974) (judicial order for surgery to remove bullet invalidated as
authorizing an unreasonable search and seizure); cf. People v. Bracamonte, 15 Cal. 3d
394, 400 n.3, 540 P.2d 624, 628 n.3, 124 Cal. Rptr. 528, 532 n.3 (1975) (suggestion that
certain bodily intrusions may not be constitutional even if authorized by search war-
rant). "Far from looking at the warrant as a protection against unreasonable searches,
[our constitutional fathers] saw it as an authority for unreasonable and oppressive
searches ..... T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 41
(1967).
86. "The Court has frequently observed that the Fourth Amendment's two clauses
impose separate, although related, limitations upon searches and seizures; the first 'is
general and forbids every search that is unreasonable'; the second places a number of
specific constraints upon the issuance and character of warrants." Berger v. New York,
388 U.S. 41, 94 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). See, e.g., Go-Bart
Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 356-57 (1931).
87. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
88. Id. at 54.
89. 385 U.S. 323 (1966). In Osborn a recording device was concealed on the
person of an informant pursuant to judicial authorization based on an affidavit detailing
previous conversations between the informant and an attorney concerning the bribery of
potential jurors in a pending criminal trial. Id. at 325-29.
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1. Failure to require probable cause to believe that a "partic-
ular offense" has been or is being committed;90
2. Failure to require that the conversations sought be "partic-
ularly described" ;91
3. Authorization of "the equivalent of a series of intrusions,
searches, and seizures pursuant to a single showing of
probable cause" because of the sixty-day period of per-
missible surveillance, lack of a requirement of prompt
execution, and lack of a requirement for present probable
cause for an extension of the authorization; 92
4. Failure to require termination of the eavesdrop once the
conversation sought was obtained;
93
5. Failure to require "some showing of special facts" to over-
come the absence of notice necessarily resulting from the
need for secrecy;94 and
90. 388 U.S. at 58. "The purpose of the probable-cause requirement of the Fourth
Amendment, to keep the state out of constitutionally protected areas until it has reason
to believe that a specific crime has been or is being committed, is thereby wholly
aborted." Id. at 59. In contrast, the affidavit in Osborn alleged "the commission of a
specific criminal offense directly and immediately affecting the administration of justice
." Id. at 57, quoting Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 330 (1966).
91. Id. at 58-59. This failure "gives the officer a roving commission to 'seize' any
and all conversations. . . . As with general warrants this leaves too much to the
discretion of the officer executing the order." Id. at 59. In Osborn "the order described
the type of conversation sought with particularity, thus indicating . . . the limitations
placed upon the officer executing the warrant." Id. at 57 (emphasis added). 'The need
for particularity and evidence of reliability in the showing required when judicial
authorization of a search is sought is especially great in the case of eavesdropping. By
its very nature eavesdropping involves an intrusion on privacy that is broad in scope."
Thus "'a heavier responsibility lis imposed] on this Court in its supervision of the
fairness of procedures . I..."' d. at 56, quoting Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S.
323, 329 n.7 (1966).
92. Id. at 59. As a result "the conversations of any and all persons coming into
the area covered by the device will be seized indiscriminately and without regard to their
connection with the crime under investigation." Id. Authorization of an extension upon
a showing that it would be "in the public interest" was held insufficient to constitute
present probable cause. Id. In Osborn the order authorized only a single seizure of a
conversation betweeen two known participants. A new order based on new probable
cause was issued for a second seizure, and the orders were executed with dispatch. "In
this manner no greater invasion of privacy was permitted than was necessary under the
circumstances." Id. at 57.
93. Id. at 59-60. Termination was thus "left entirely in the discretion of the
officer." Id. at 60. In Osborn "once the property sought, and for which the order was
issued, was found the officer could not use the order as a passkey to further search." Id.
at 57.
94. Id. at 60. "Such a showing of exigency, in order to avoid notice, would appear
more important in eavesdropping, with its inherent dangers, than that required when
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6. Failure to provide for a return on the warrant."
The Court further clarified the constitutional standards for a valid
electronic eavesdropping order in Katz v. United States. 6 In that case,
government agents began their eavesdropping only after investigation
had established strong probability that the telephone was being used in
violation of federal law.9 7  Surveillance was limited to the discovery of
the contents of the communications, confined solely to the periods when
the suspect was actually using the telephone booth, and conducted so
that only the conversations of the suspect himself were overheard. The
Court concluded that a magistrate "could constitutionally have author-
ized, with appropriate safeguards, the very limited search and seizure
that the Government asserts in fact took place."98 But even though the
agents "reasonably expected to find evidence of a particular crime and
voluntarily confined their activities to the least intrusive means consis-
tent with that end,"99 the search was held unreasonable for failure to
satisfy the constitutional precondition of prior judicial authorization. 100
C. Title IM Provisions
Relying on the guidelines provided by the Court in Berger and
Katz, and spurred by rising crimes rates and calls for "law and order,"''1
Congress passed Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968.102 Title III prohibits the use of electronic eaves-
dropping to intercept wire or oral communications""3 without the con-
conventional procedures of search and seizure are utilized." Id. The Court made no
specific reference, however, to any such showing in Osborn.
95. Id. The statute thereby left "full discretion in the officer as to the use of
seized conversations of innocent as well as guilty parties." Id. In Osborn "the officer
was required to and did make a return on the order showing how it was executed and
what was seized." Id. at 57.
96. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See text accompanying notes 69-75 supra.
97. Id. at 354.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 356-57.
100. Id. at 359.
101. See Schwartz, The Legitimation of Electronic Eavesdropping: The Politics of
"Law and Order," 67 MICH. L. REv. 455-56 (1969).
102. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970).
103. Id. § 2511(1) (1970). "Wire communications" are communications made over
telephone or telegraph lines. Id. § 2510(1) (1970). "Oral communications" are "any
oral communication[s] uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communi-
cation is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation." Id.
§ 2510(2) (1970). "Intercept" is defined as "the aural acquisition of the contents of
any wire or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other
device." Id. § 2510(4) (1970).
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sent of one of the parties to the communication °4 except under carefully
limited conditions for law enforcement purposes. The strict procedural
requirements of Title III, derived from the constitutional standards
prescribed by Berger and Katz, are contained in section 2518.105
First, this section requires that an application for an interception
order be supported by "a full and complete statement of the facts and
circumstances relied upon by the applicant, to justify his belief that an
order should be issued."' 0 6 A judge may issue an order only upon a
finding of treble probable cause, that is, probable cause to believe that:
1. An individual has committed, is committing, or is about
to commit a particular offense;
07
2. Particular communications concerning that offense will be
obtained through such interception;108 and
3. The facilities from which, or the place where, the wire or
oral communications are to be intercepted are being used,
104. Interception with the consent of one of the parties to the communication is not
prohibited. Id. § 2511(2) (c) (1970). Such "consent" eavesdropping is not considered
a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. United States v. White, 401 U.S.
745 (1971); Osbom v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373
U.S. 427 (1963); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952). Contra, People v.
Beavers, 393 Mich. 554, 227 N.W.2d 511 (1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 152 (1975)
(relying on state constitution). The theory is that no one can have a reasonable
expectation "that a person with whom he is conversing will not then or later reveal the
conversation to the police." United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971) (plurality
opinion). For constitutional purposes the use of a tape recorder or transmitter to make
the report to the police is irrelevant. 401 U.S. at 751 (plurality opinion).
An analogous problem could arise in the use of electronic snooping technology.
For example, an informant could carry a briefcase containing a concealed camera, or
indeed could have a minature camera lens concealed on his person. See text accompany-
ing note 38 supra. Acts of the suspect with whom the informant was meeting could be
transmitted to a remote location for videotaping. A mechanical application of the White
rationale would lead to the conclusion that there was no reasonable expectation that the
informant would not report to the police the suspect's appearance, physical description,
and activities that he observed, and that a surreptitiously made videotape recording is
merely a more accurate way to make such a report. A videotape recording, however,
would convey considerably more information about a person than a recording of his
spoken words. Such an intrusion should at least be considered a search under the Fourth
Amendment. "Although one assumes the risk that a guest may verbally divulge his
appearance he does not assume the risk that the same guest may photograph him without
his consent." Comment, Consent to Electronic Surveillance by a Party to a Conversa-
tion: A Different Approach, 10 TULSA L.J. 386, 389 (1975).
105. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1970). See SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 88-108.
106. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b) (1970).
107. Id. § 2518(3)(a) (1970).
108. Id. § 2518(3)(b) (1970).
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or are about to be used, in connection with the com-
mission of such offense.' 09
Second, in satisfaction of the particularity requirement the state-
ment of facts and circumstances must include:
1. Details as to the particular offense that has been, is being,
or is about to be committed;
2. A particular description of the nature and location of the
facilities from which or the place where the communica-
tion is to be intercepted;
3. A particular description of the type of communication
sought to be intercepted; and
4. The identity of the person, if known, committing the of-
fense and whose communications are to be intercepted. 110
Third, the applicant must make a statement of the period of time
for which the interception is required to be maintained."' If additional
communications of the same type are expected, the facts establishing
probable cause to believe that such additional communications will
occur after the first one has been obtained must be particularly de-
scribed.-"s The order may authorize interception only for as long as
necessary to achieve the objective of the authorization and in no event
longer than thirty days."' In addition, every interception must be
conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of communica-
tions not otherwise subject to interception." .
Finally, the application must contain a full and complete statement
as to whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and
failed or why they reasonably appear unlikely to succeed if tried or to be
too dangerous."' An order may be issued only if the judge finds, upon
the facts presented by the applicant, that normal investigative procedures
109. Id. § 2518(3)(d) (1970).
110. Id. § 2518(1)(b) (1970). See United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143 (1974).
111. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1) (d) (1970).
112. Id.
113. Id. § 2518(5) (1970). Extensions for up to 30 days may be obtained upon a
new showing of probable cause. Id.
114. Id. See generally Note, Minimization and the Fourth Amendment, 19
N.Y.L.F. 861 (1974) (constitutional basis of the minimization requirement); Note,
Minimization of Wire Interception: Presearch Guidelines and Postsearch Remedies, 26
STAN. L. REV. 1411 (1974).
115. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1) (c) (1970). See generally Note, Electronic Surveillance,
Title III, and the Requirement of Necessity, 2 HAsT. CONsT. L.Q. 571 (1975).
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have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to
succeed if tried or to be too dangerous."'
D. Procedural Requirements for an Electronic Snooping Order
Central to the Court's decision in Berger was its recognition that
without a carefully circumscribed authorization procedure the use of
electronic eavesdropping would constitute a general search in violation
of the Fourth Amendment." 7 In order to avoid this result the Court
emphasized throughout its opinion the need to eliminate any discretion
on the part of the officer executing the order."" The Court summa-
rized its holding by finding that the New York statute in question was
"without adequate judicial supervision or protective procedures."" 9
Title III has been found constitutional on the ground that its
provisions are "as precise and discriminate. . . as are the demands of
Berger and Katz."'20  To the extent that Title m's provisions tend to
restrict the executing officers' discretion, therefore, they may be said to
be constitutionally based on Berger's demand for adequate protective
procedures. . Moreover, to the extent that any clandestine electronic
intrusion upon an individual's privacy would constitute a general search
in the absence of such protective procedures, Berger and Title III may
be said to indicate a broad outline of the facial requirements of any
electronic surveillance order. The next section will discuss the reasona-
bleness of electronic snooping with respect to four requirements that
appear to be constitutionally mandated: particularity, length of surveil-
lance, minimization and necessity.
V. Is Electronic Snooping Reasonable?
The oft-repeated rule for determining the reasonableness of a
Fourth Amendment search is that a balancing test is to be utilized:
"[Tihere can be no ready test for determining reasonableness other than
by balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search
entails."' 21
In practice electronic snooping might be used in conjunction with a
116. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c) (1970).
117. 388 U.S. at 58.
118. Id. at 57-60. See notes 91, 93, 95 supra.
119. Id. at 60.
120. United States v. Cafero, 473 F.2d 489, 495 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 918 (1974), quoting United States v. Cox, 449 F.2d 679, 687 (10th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 934 (1972).
121. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967).
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listening device authorized under Title III, thus providing an accurate
visual record of the events which took place during a valid electronic
eavesdrop. 122  This does not imply, however, that the constitutional
standards governing the use of the listening device similarly would
authorize the use of the camera. Because of the significantly different
privacy interests invaded by its use, the reasonableness of electronic
snooping must be evaluated on its own terms by reference to the
balancing test. This evaluation requires an examination of the law
enforcement justification for electronic snooping and the extent to which
it intrudes upon personal privacy. In considering the constitutionality
of -this latest method for clandestine intrusion upon individual privacy, it
is important to keep in mind' a twice-repeated warning of the Supreme
Court:
It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least
repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get
their first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and
slight deviations from legal modes of procedure.
123
A. Procedural Requirements in Factual Context
1. Particularity
Electronic snooping could be utilized either to view a "private
act,"' 2 4 in a manner similar to electronic eavesdropping on private
conversations, or to observe a particular tangible object' 25 and 'to record
its presence in the area under surveillance. In either case the first
consideration is the degree of particularity required of the application
and order.
The issuance of an electronic snooping order would require the
existence of probable cause to believe that a specific offense'26 was
under investigation and that at an identifiable location'27 particular acts
or objects related to the commission of that offense would be ob-
122. For example, see text accompanying note 1 supra.
123. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961), quoting Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
124. A "private act" may be defined, by analogy to electronic eavesdropping, as an
act performed by a person exhibiting an expectation that such act is not subject to
viewing under circumstances justifying such expectation. See note 103 supra.
125. Electronic snooping might be employed for this purpose when the object is one
which may be easily disposed of or destroyed. By recording the object's presence in the
area under surveillance, its evidentiary value would be preserved even if it were not
seized intact in a subsequent physical search. For example, such objects might include
narcotics paraphernalia or gambling records.
126. See notes 90, 107 supra and text accompanying.
127. See text accompanying note 110 supra.
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served.12  Presumably a detailed description of the "type of act' 1 29 or
of the specific tangible object 30 would sufficiently describe the thing to
be seized. An adequate description of the place to be searched would
be more difficult. A camera's usefulness is necessarily limited to ob-
servation of acts or objects within the room where the camera is lo-
cated. Therefore, the application and order would have to specify the
precise location within the premises where the acts were expected to
take place or the objects were expected to be located.' 3 ' This particu-
larity is necessary for the existence of probable cause to believe that
the officer's placement of the camera will actually reveal the acts or
objects to be viewed. 1 2 In the absence of such an exacting require-
ment the officer could exercise his own discretion as to the placement
of the camera, thereby permitting the search of unauthorized areas in
violation of the requirements of Berger.1
33
2. Length of Surveillance
An electronic snooping order could presumably authorize observa-
tion of private acts over a period of time sufficient to attain the objective
128. See text accompanying note 108 supra. This would indicate "the specific
objective of the Government ... and the limitations placed upon the officer executing
the warrant." Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 57 (1967).
129. See note 91 supra and text accompanying. An act, like an oral communication,
cannot be more particularly described until after it has occurred. See United States v.
Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764, 780 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973).
130. See Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927). See generally Cook,
Requisite Particularity in Search Warrant Authorizations, 38 TENN. L. REV. 496, 505-07
(1971).
131. For example, the criminal acts might be taking place in a bedroom; installation
of a camera in the living room would be useless.
132. This problem clearly does not exist when wiretapping is employed; identifica-
tion of the premises where the telephone to be tapped is located provides sufficient
particularity as to the place to be searched. The absence of a similar problem with
respect to "bugging" is not so clear, at least when conversations in a multiroom house or
similar premises are to be overheard. Due to the relatively small number of bugging
authorizations, the precise problem may not have arisen. See note 153 infra. Also,
bugging frequently may be conducted under circumstances permitting the interception
of all conversations because of the limited size of the premises under surveillance.
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (phone booth); Berger v. New
York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (law office); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129
(1942) (hotel room). Finally, the eavesdropping method employed may enable the
overhearing of conversations throughout the entire premises. See Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) ("spike mike" contacting heating duct).
133. 388 U.S. at 57. As an alternative, cameras might be installed in each room on
the premises where it is likely that the acts or objects will be viewed. However, this
procedure might well constitute such a "broadside authorization" as to result in "general
searches by electronic devices" of the type condemned in Berger. Id. at 58. See id. at
65 (Douglas, J., concurring); cf. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
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of the snooping. Termination upon observation of an incriminating act
would not be required if probable cause existed to believe that similar
acts would thereafter- occur. 34 A different situation would exist, how-
ever, if the order authorized a search for a tangible object. In order to
satisfy the particularity requirement as to the place to be searched, there
would have to be probable cause to believe that the object would be
viewed in the particular room where the camera was installed, at the
time the camera was activated.' 3 5 If the object were not observed at
that time, the probable cause to believe that it would be observed would
no longer exist. Without a new authorization based on new probable
cause, a subsequent search for the same object would be invalid as
constituting "a series of intrusions, searches, and seizures pursuant to a
single showing of probable cause."' 6
The result is that electronic snooping for a tangible object could
only be used on a "one-time-only" basis. For each showing of probable
cause, the camera could be activated only once and left on only as long
as reasonably necessary to determine the presence or absence of the item
in question. If the item were observed, the objective of the authoriza-
tion would be accomplished and the observation would have to be
terminated. 13 7 If it were not observed, the officers could not unreasona-
bly prolong their search or expand it with the hope of seeing something
incriminating beyond the scope of their authorization. '-8
3. Minimization
Title III requires that every interception of wire or oral communi-
cations be conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of
communications not otherwise subject to interception.139  While the
specific form of this provision has been referred to as a "statutory
command,"' 40 the principle which it embodies is clearly constitutionally
based. The Court has held that "a search which is reasonable at its
inception may violate the Fourth Amendment by virtue of its intolerable
134. See text accompanying notes 111-113 supra. Title Il's limitation of 30 days is
a maximum, and can be shortened by the authorizing judge on a case-by-case basis
depending on the specific objective of the interception. See United States v. Cafero, 473
F.2d 489, 495 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974).
135. See text accompanying note 131 supra.
136. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59 (1967). See Sgro v. United States, 287
U.S. 206, 211 (1932).
137. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 57 (1967).
138. Id.
139. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1970). See text accompanying note 114 supra.
140. E.g., United States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293, 1300 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 918 (1974).
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intensity and scope.' 141 Lack of an attempt to minimize interception of
innocent or irrelevant conversations results in the seizure of "the conver-
sations of any and all persons coming into the area covered by the device
. . . without regard to their connection with the crime under investiga-
tion."'142 Electronic eavesdropping conducted in this manner, even
pursuant to a properly particularized court order, would undoubtedly be
of such "intolerable intensity and scope" as to be unreasonable. 3
Moreover, minimization has been referred to as one of the "protective
procedures"' 44 by which the electronic eavesdropping authorized by
Title I1 is found to be reasonable.' 45  Thus Title HI's minimization
requirement appears to be based upon the constitutional limitations
inherent in any Fourth Amendment search as well as upon Berger's
procedural safeguards against the inherent dangers of clandestine sur-
veillance. By analogy, it will be assumed that minimization in the
execution of an electronic snooping order similarly would be constitu-
tionally mandated.
Compliance with the minimization requirement is to be measured
by whether "on the whole the agents have shown a high regard for the
right of privacy and have done all they reasonably could to avoid
unnecessary intrusion.' 46  Minimization is accomplished by avoiding
interception of all calls falling within nonpertinent categories, as soon as
141. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 18 (1968); see Von Cleef v. New Jersey, 395 U.S.
814 (1969); Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346 (1957); People v. Bracamonte, 15
Cal. 3d 394, 400, 540 P.2d 624, 628, 124 Cal. Rptr. 528, 532 (1975).
142. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59 (1967).
143. See United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 326 (1972)
(Douglas, J., concurring); Von Cleef v. New Jersey, 395 U.S. 814, 817 (1969) (Harlan,
J., concurring in the result); United States v. George, 465 F.2d 772 (6th Cir. 1972).
See generally Note, Minimization and the Fourth Amendment, 19 N.Y.L.F. 861, 875-78
(1974).
144. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 60 (1967). See text accompanying notes
117-120 supra.
145. United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 154 (1974); United States v. Focarile,
340 F. Supp. 1033, 1038, 1044 (D. Md.), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. United States
v. Giordano, 469 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1972), aff'd, 416 U.S. 505 (1974); United States v.
King, 335 F. Supp. 523, 532, 541 (S.D. Cal. 1971), modified on other grounds, 478 F.2d
494 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 920 (1974); United States v. Leta, 332 F.
Supp. 1357, 1360 (M.D. Pa. 1971); see Bynum v. United States, 96 S. Ct. 357 (1975)
(Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
146. United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764, 784 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
866 (1973); see United States v. Scott, 504 F.2d 194, 198-99 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Factors
to be taken into account in determining the reasonableness of minimization procedures
include the scope of the criminal enterprise under investigation, the location and
operation of the subject telephone, whether a pattern of incriminating conversations
emerges, and the degree of supervision by the authorizing judge. United States v. James,
494 F.2d 1007, 1019-21 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1020 (1974).
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the agents have sufficient information to establish such categories. 47
These principles allow the minimization procedures applicable to elec-
tronic snooping to be compared and contrasted with those used in
wiretapping and bugging.
a. Analogy to Wiretapping
The officers executing a wiretap order normally become aware of
the commencement of a conversation whose interception may be author-
ized by the occurrence of a trigger "signal" in the form of either the
ringing or the dialing of the tapped telephone. A minimization decision
based on the contents of the communication can be made within a short
time thereafter.14  Thus the privacy of the premises where the
phone is located is invaded by a wiretap only when an activity of the
type whose seizure has been authorized is actually in progress. The
minimization requirement insures that the invasion of privacy will termi-
nate promptly if the conversation is not in an incriminating category. In
addition, a wiretap only invades the privacy of the actual parties to the
conversation. In this way the objective of the authorization is fulfilled
while "the danger of an unlawful search and seizure [is] minimized."'
49
An attempt to fulfill the objective of an electronic snooping order,
however, necessarily involves a much more indiscriminate intrusion.
Although probable cause would exist to believe that incriminating acts
would be viewed on the premises, there would be no signal, as in the
case of wiretapping, to alert the snoopers to the commencement of an
act whose viewing might be authorized. The snoopers would presum-
ably have to "tune-in" on the premises at random intervals in order
to determine whether an act was occurring which might properly be ob-
served. Such intrusions might view only an empty room or an individual
engaged in no activity, so that the minimization requirement would
dictate that the intrusion terminate. Shortly after the termination,
147. United States v. Scott, 516 F.2d 751, 754-55 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United States v.
Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764, 785 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973). But
interception of calls of short duration need not be terminated before the nature of the
calls and the identities of the parties can be determined. United States v. Bynum, 485
F.2d 490, 500 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S. 903 (1974).
148. This is subject to the qualification that conspirators who know they may be
under surveillance frequently use code words or deliberately discuss innocent matters at
the beginning of a call, which may justify a longer period of listening to determine the
actual nature of the call. See United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29, 39 n.12 (3d Cir.
1975); United States v. Quintana, 508 F.2d 867, 874-75 n.6 (7th Cir. 1975); United
States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007, 1019 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1020 (1974).
149. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 57 (1967).
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however, acts might take place whose viewing in fact was authorized.
Without a signal to alert them that such an act was occurring the
snoopers would be unaware of it and the objective of the authorization
would be frustrated.
From a practical standpoint, therefore, the effectiveness of elec-
tronic snooping in attaining its objective might be seriously undermined
unless the snooping were virtually continuous. Only in this way would
the agents, not knowing when an incriminating act was likely to occur,
have a reasonable chance of actually observing the act when it did occur.
While this might be all that the agents reasonably could do to avoid
unnecessary intrusion and still accomplish their objective, the resulting
invasion of privacy might well exceed the "precise and discriminate"
standard required by Berger5' and Katz.' 5'
b. Analogy to Bugging
No cases have been found which deal with the question of minimi-
zation in the context of electronic bugging. Presumably the minimiza-
tion requirement applies to the extent that it is consistent with the
effectiveness of the bug.15 z In such cases a "tune-in" procedure such as
described above for electronic snooping would seem to be appropri-
ate. 53  To this extent the two surveillance techniques would be on an
150. Id.
151. 389 U.S. at 355.
152. Situations are conceivable in which the continuous monitoring of a listening
device for a limited period of time might be fully justified, such as for surveillance of a
meeting of organized crime leaders or other known conspirators. Some courts have
upheld the continuous monitoring of all telephone conversations as a reasonable compli-
ance with the minimization requirement when virtually all conversations were incrimi-
nating or when no predictable pattern or category of innocent calls could be determined.
United States v. Scott, 516 F.2d 751, 758-60 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United States v.
Quintana, 508 F.2d 867, 873 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007,
1018-23 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1020 (1974); United States v. Manfredi, 488
F.2d 588, 600 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 936 (1974); United States v.
Bynum, 485 F.2d 490, 500 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S. 903
(1974); United States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293, 1301 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 918 (1974). With respect to minimization, the continuous use of electronic
snooping in such situations would presumably be valid as well.
153. As in the case of electronic snooping, however, it might be difficult to properly
minimize interception of innocent conversations in this way and still intercept the
information for which the eavesdrop was authorized. This difficulty may be a signifi-
cant factor in the very low percentage of Title I authorizations for bugging rather than
wiretapping. See, e.g., ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNr.E STATES COURTS, REPORT
ON APPLICATIONS FOR ORDERS AUTHORIZING OR APPROVING THE INTERCEPTION OF WIRE
OR ORAL COMMUNICATIONS FOR THE PERIOD JANUARY 1, 1973 TO DECEMBER 31, 1973, at
16 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1973 REPORT] (90% of all authorizations were for phone
wire interceptions).
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equal footing with respect to the reasonableness of their minimization
procedures.1
5 4
Aside from -the greater personal interest invaded by electronic
snooping, however, even a valid attempt to minimize observation of in-
nocent acts would entail a more severe intrusion upon privacy than mini-
mization in the context of electronic eavesdropping. An electronic eaves-
dropping tune-in might result in overhearing nothing at all, if no conver-
sations were taking place at the time of the intrusion. The visual tune-in,
however, would always see something, even if only an empty room. In
both cases a search has taken place, because of the intrusion into an area
protected by a reasonable expectation of privacy.155 But when nothing
is overheard there has been no seizure of an individual's private conver-
sations, whereas the visual observation constitutes a simultaneous search
and seizure.5' The visual tune-in "seizes" a view of an area protected
by a reasonable expectation of privacy against such viewing even when
no private acts are observed. Due to the nature of electronic snooping,
therefore, even minimization procedures identical to those used in elec-
tronic eavesdropping will result in a more serious intrusion upon per-
sonal privacy.
4. Necessity
Title mE provides that an interception order may be issued only if
the judge finds that normal investigative procedures have been tried and
have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to
be too dangerous.' 57 That this provision supplies the "exigency" de-
manded by Berger5 8 in order to avoid presearch notice to the victim of
a clandestine intrusion is now generally recognized. 159 This require-
ment also follows directly from the Fourth Amendment balancing test:
if "the scope of the particular intrusion, in light of all the exigencies of
154. Neither the Court nor Title M makes a constitutional distinction between
wiretapping and bugging, despite the arguably greater breadth of the intrusion resulting
from the use of listening devices. See United States v. Escandar, 319 F. Supp. 295, 301
(S.D. Fla. 1970), remanded on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Robinson, 472
F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam). Indeed, both Berger and Katz involved
interception of communications by bugging rather than wiretapping.
155. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
156. "The Government's activities in electronically listening to and recording the
petitioner's words ... constituted a 'search and seizure' within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment." Id. at 353 (emphasis added).
157. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c) (1970).
158. 388 U.S. at 60.
159. See Note, Electronic Surveillance, Title III, and the Requirement of Necessity,
2 HAST. CONsT. L.Q. 571, 577-86 (1975), and cases cited therein at 585 n.77.
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the case,"'160 exceeds what is reasonably necessary to accomplish a
legitimate law enforcement goal, the intrusion should be declared unrea-
sonable."'
The reasonableness of electronic snooping will therefore depend on
whether other less intrusive techniques can be utilized to accomplish the
same law enforcement objective. Now, however, these currently availa-
ble less intrusive techniques include electronic eavesdropping. Whenever
the same objective can be accomplished by a conventional search and
seizure, or by a conventional search and seizure supplemented with
electronic eavesdropping, electronic snooping will fail to satisfy the
necessity requirement.
B. Application of the Necessity Requirement
1. Viewing of Tangible Objects
As discussed above,' 62 electronic snooping for tangible objects
where destruction of the evidence is feared would be limited to use on a
one-time-only basis, for if the authorized observation did not reveal the
object the probable cause supporting the order would no longer exist.
This one-time-only use of electronic snooping, however, should be held
unreasonable for failure to satisfy the necessity requirement.
In Ker v. California,6 3 the Court recognized a judicial exception to
the general requirement that the officers executing a search warrant
announce their identity and purpose before entering in cases where they
reasonably believe that the announcement will provoke the destruction
of critical evidence.164 This exception permits the accomplishment of
160. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 18 n.15 (1968).
161. It may be that in the context of conventional searches and seizures, a search is
not made unreasonable simply because the public interest could have been protected in a
less intrusive manner. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 447 (1973). The
Berger opinion made it clear, however, that in the case of electronic surveillance, a
"heavier responsibility" is placed on the Court because of the broad scope and inherent
dangers involved. 388 U.S. at 56. As interpreted by lower courts, Berger may in fact
state a doctrine of "less intrusive means" when considering the reasonableness of any
kind of clandestine electronic surveillance. "[T]he Court has long been critical of secret
searches. Electronic surveillance cannot be justified unless other methods of investiga-
tion are not practicable." United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764, 774 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973) (citation omitted). It is "a touchstone consideration in
surveillance that 'no greater invasion of privacy [be] permitted than was necessary under
the circumstances."' United States v. Martyniuk, 395 F. Supp. 42, 44 (D. Or. 1975),
quoting Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 57 (1967). See Comment, Police Helicopter
Surveillance, 15 ARiz. L. REv. 145, 170 (1973).
162. See text accompanying notes 135-38 supra.
163. 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
164. Id. at 37-41. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 355-56 n.16 (1967).
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the same objective as electronic snooping with much less serious conse-
quences to the individual's privacy. 165 Since the needs of law enforce-
ment can be met'66 by use of this judicial exception to the notice
requirement, the use of electronic snooping to determine the presence of
tangible objeots should be considered unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.
2. Viewing of "Private Acts"
The need for the use of electronic eavesdropping in law enforce-
ment stems primarily from its unique ability to acquire information in
certain kinds of cases involving organized crime, gambling conspiracies
or drug rings, 7 which is vital to the successful prosecution of these
offenses and can be acquired in no other way.' Title I was intended
specifically as a tool to combat organized crime, and is considered
particularly useful for this purpose because of the dependence of organ-
ized crime on telephone communications to coordinate its worldwide
165. Justice Brennan objected to this judicial exception to the "announcement of
purpose" requirement on the ground that "[ilnnocent citizens should not suffer the
shock, fright or embarrassment attendant upon an unannounced police intrusion." Ker
v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 57 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Court in Katz discounted
the idea that this objection would be relevant to electronic eavesdropping. 389 U.S. at
355-56 n.16. This should not be taken to indicate that electronic snooping would some-
how have less serious consequences upon a person's privacy than an unannounced police
intrusion. Shock, fright and embarrassment would be felt as a result of an unannounced
police intrusion whether the intrusion was direct and physical or indirect by means of an
electronic eye. The latter invasion would in fact have more serious consequences for the
individual's sense of security simply because an individual can adjust his conduct in an
appropriate manner upon becoming aware of a physical intrusion, whereas he may not
learn of the electronic invasion until long afterwards.
166. The officers would need probable cause to believe that the object would be
found in a certain location within the premises before sufficient particularity for the
issuance of an electronic snooping order would exist. See notes 131-33 supra and text
accompanying. Similarly there would have to be probable cause to believe that the
object would be observed in plain view, because otherwise television observation would
be useless. With such a high degree of particularity an unannounced physical intrusion
would almost certainly accomplish the seizure successfully, because the officers would
know exactly where to look.
167. Narcotics and gambling cases comprise the great bulk of the investigations in
which electronic eavesdropping is authorized. See, e.g., 1973 REPORT, supra note 153, at
8 (75% of all intercept orders were for gambling or narcotics).
168. The factors rendering conventional investigative methods ineffective in organ-
ized crime investigations include the insulation of street workers known to police from the
leaders of the conspiracies, a code of silence preventing testimony of those who might be
able to provide evidence against the leaders, and the inability of informants to penetrate
the conspiracy. See generally PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON L-.%,v ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIErY 198-201
(1967) 1hereinafter cited as THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY].
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activities. 16 9  However, because of its "inherent dangers,"'170 electronic
eavesdropping cannot be considered reasonable except when other less
intrusive methods of acquiring the same information prove inade-
quate. 17  Similarly, electronic snooping would be permissible only if it
would provide information to law enforcement agencies which is both
essential and currently unavailable through the use of conventional
methods, including electronic eavesdropping.
In the investigation of gambling conspiracies, for example, the
interception of telephone communications may be the only way to gather
the critical information necessary for a successful prosecution. Large-
scale gambling conspiracies conduct their operations almost exclusively
by telephone, the members of the conspiracy generally keep meager
written records, and informants are normally unable to gain access to
the overall scheme.' 2  Physical surveillance is normally ineffective
because "there is little or no personal contact between these persons."' 73
In the case of federal prosecutions, without wiretapping it may be
impossible to establish "the interstate nature of the gambling opera-
tion."4
These arguments provide no justification for the additional use of
electronic snooping in gambling investigations. If there is little or no
personal contact between the members of a gambling conspiracy, a
camera would provide little or no evidence of gambling transactions
which cannot be acquired currently through electronic eavesdropping.
The most that a strategically located camera might provide would be
visual evidence of money changing hands, which would tend to corrob-
orate the intercepted conversations concerning the illegal transactions
but would not constitute independent evidence of a crime by itself or
lead to conspirators who cannot be identified otherwise. It is unlikely
169. SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 70-71.
170. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 60 (1967).
171. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) & (3)(c) (1970). However, electronic eavesdropping
is not necessarily barred by the necessity requirement even if an informant is available to
testify or if probable cause for an arrest is present. See United States v. Staino, 358 F.
Supp. 852, 857 (E.D. Pa. 1973); United States v. Lanza, 356 F. Supp. 27, 30 (M.D. Fla.
1973). Frequently the objective of the interception is to identify other members of a
conspiracy who are as yet unknown to both the police and the informant. See, e.g.,
United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29, 38 (3d Cir. 1975); Note, Electronic Surveil-
lance, Title III, and the Requirement of Necessity, 2 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 571, 613 n.176
(1975) (averment to this effect contained in every wiretap application examined).
172. See, e.g., United States v. Bobo, 477 F.2d 974, 982-83 (4th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 909 (1975).
173. Id. at 983 (agent's affidavit).
174. Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Leta, 332 F. Supp. 1357, 1362 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
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that visual observation of a closed area would provide evidence of the
interstate nature of the operation. In fact, interception of long distance
phone calls appears to be an ideal method of acquiring such evidence.175
Also, due to the absence of written records little tangible evidence would
normally be observed by a hidden camera in gambling cases. Moreover,
there is no indication at present that properly restricted electronic eaves-
dropping is ineffective in the investigation and prosecution of gambling
conspiracies. Therefore there is no apparent law enforcement need for
the additional tool of electronic snooping, because there is no showing
that its use would result in the conviction of gamblers who presently
escape prosecution.
Similarly, at present there is no indication of the necessity for
electronic snooping in the investigation and prosecution of large narcot-
ics operations. Electronic eavesdropping has proven to be an effective
technique in cases involving the use of telephone facilities to coordinate
the world-wide shipment and distribution of narcotics. 176 Conventional
investigative techniques are often ineffective because of the inability of
informants to penetrate the conspiracy and the drug dealer's extreme
caution.
177
If the leaders of a narcotics conspiracy use the telephone exclusively
to direct the operation without face-to-face meetings with other
members of their distributing network, interception of these telephone
conversations would provide the evidence necessary to prove the crime
and electronic snooping would serve no additional purpose. 178 Possibly
175. See United States v. Cafero, 473 F.2d 389, 493 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 918 (1974).
176. See United States v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033, 1042-43 (D. Md.), aff'd on
other grounds sub nom. United States v. Giordano, 469 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1972), affd,
416 U.S. 505 (1974); United States v. King, 335 F. Supp. 523, 535 (S.D. Cal. 1971),
modified on other grounds, 478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 920
(1974); United States v. Scott, 331 F. Supp. 233, 242 (D.D.C. 1971), vacated on other
grounds, 504 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. Escandar, 319 F. Supp. 295,
303 (S.D. Fla. 1970), remanded sub nom. United States v. Robinson, 472 F.2d 973 (5th
Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
177. See, e.g., United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29, 38 (3d Cir. 1975); United
States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007, 1013-16 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1020 (1974).
178. The recent Report of the President's Domestic Council Task Force on Drug
Abuse recommended a focus on prosecution of the leaders of high-level trafficking
networks as the most effective way to cut off drug supplies. The report stated that
conspiracy cases are the only effective means for the law to reach these leaders since
they "normally insulate themselves from overt illegal acts by delegating these acts to
subordinates." 18 CaiM. L. REP. 2128, 2129 (1975) (emphasis added). If the leaders
commit no overt illegal acts themselves then electronic snooping on their activities would
provide no independent evidence of crime.
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clandestine observation of a plant for the processing of illegal narcotics
would yield useful evidence. But the strict particularity required prior
to the issuance of an electronic snooping order would fully justify a
conventional search and seizure. A clandestine method of intrusion
would be necessary only to develop further information as to the nature
and scope of the conspiracy without alerting the suspects to the surveil-
lance. Electronic snooping would be no more useful for this purpose
than electronic eavesdropping. Also, electronic snooping appears to be
an ineffective technique for observation of actual drug sales to the users
of the drugs. Evidence of such sales can be proyided by the use of
wired informers or undercover agents who purchase drugs" with marked
money. 179 Often sales take place with insufficient advance notice to
permit the installation of electronic snooping equipment. Frequently,
too, sales take place on the street or in other semi-public places where
traditional camera surveillance can be employed,8 0 even at night, 8"'
with sufficient advance warning to allow the installation of the equip-
ment. Thus the unique ability of electronic eavesdropping to provide
information vital to narcotics investigations finds no parallel in electron-
ic snooping.
The primary justification for any clandestine information-gathering
technique in law enforcement therefore appears to be its ability to
uncover the full scope of a criminal conspiracy without alerting already
known suspects to the existence of the investigation. Since any broad
conspiracy of this type necessarily involves the extensive use of oral
communications between the conspirators, interception of these commu-
nications is the primary investigative tool.'8 2 It follows logically that
the only other area in which electronic snooping might be effective is in
the investigation of small-scale or individual offenses, such as personal
drug use, prostitution or a neighborhood poker game. In such cases
electronic surveillance is unnecessary since there is no conspiracy whose
scope is to be uncovered. The probable cause necessary for the issuance
of an electronic snooping order would support a conventional search
and seizure, which would be equally effective. Therefore, in the investi-
gation of either large-scale conspiracies or individual offenses, electronic
snooping would fail to satisfy the necessity requirement.
179. See United States v. Quintana, 508 F.2d 867, 872-73 (7th Cir. 1975).
180. Id.
181. See text accompanying notes 41-47 supra.
182. Electronic eavesdropping "has a well-established record of producing positive
results against the veteran practitioners of organized crime." 18 CuRM. L. RFP. 2082,
2083 (1975) (remarks of F.B.I. Director Clarence M. Kelley).
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C. Application of the Balancing Test
1. Nature of the Invasion of Privacy
Electronic snooping clearly intrudes upon individual privacy to a
greater extent than does electronic eavesdropping. During the surveil-
lance the invasion of privacy by observation is continuous rather than
limited to periods of actual communication as in the case of electronic
eavesdropping. Electronic snooping is thus literally inescapable, even
in the dark, whereas electronic eavesdropping can at least be avoided by
maintaining silence.
In addition, the privacy interest invaded is significantly greater.
Electronic snooping invades not merely the oral expression of thoughts
but the intimate province of freedom from physical exposure of one's
body to the view of others. An oral communication has already lost
some of the privacy accorded to pure thought merely by the fact of
communication to another person. Therefore no absolute expectation of
privacy exists in any oral communication, because the listener can
always inform the police of what he has heard. 8 3 But the expectation
of privacy in activity performed in the absence of any known observa-
tion is absolute. The act of viewing such activity by clandestine means
must be considered a more serious intrusion upon individual privacy and
integrity than the overhearing of oral communications to other persons.
Finally, in its practical operation electronic snooping would un-
avoidably constitute a greater invasion of privacy than electronic eaves-
dropping. The application of minimization principles to the execution
of an electronic snooping order would inevitably invade the individual's
privacy to a greater extent than the corresponding search conducted by
electronic eavesdropping. 184 This greater invasion of privacy would be
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment in the absence of corre-
spondingly greater law enforcement justification.
2. Law Enforcement Justification
As discussed above, 85 there is no apparent necessity for electronic
snooping in law enforcement because of the availability of electronic
eavesdropping and other conventional investigative tools. While elec-
tronic snooping might provide corroborating evidence of crime it would
not by itself enable the prosecution of criminals who presently escape
prosecution because of the inability of law enforcement officials to gath-
183. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
184. See text accompanying notes 148-156 supra.
185. See text accompanying notes 162-182 supra.
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er sufficient evidence. If rather than to obtain direct evidence of crime,
electronic snooping were to be used, for example, to identify the partici-
pants in a suspected meeting of organized crime leaders or other con-
spirators, less intrusive alternative techniques again could accomplish
the same objective. Such techniques as visual surveillance outside of the
premises, including methods for overcoming darkness or distance, 186
and conventional voice identification methods applied to the oral com-
munications which could be overheard by a listening device authorized
by Title III, should prove adequate for individual identification without
resort to electronic snooping.
The other major argument in favor of legalized electronic eaves-
dropping is that because organized crime is making free use of the
telephone in furtherance of its criminal objectives, wiretapping is a
necessary law enforcement response in opposition to this "perversion of
the telephone to criminal use."'187  The addition of electronic snooping
to the police arsenal cannot be supported by this same justification.
Undoubtedly criminals still commit murders, store stolen merchandise
and grow marijuana plants in violation of the law within the confines of
their homes or offices. Yet they do so not with the aid of television or
any other new technological development which might justify a law
enforcement response in kind, but behind the same four walls which
have traditionally protected them from unwanted visual intrusions.
88
In the absence of any new development preventing or hindering the
exercise of conventional search and seizure power, it is an insufficient
justification for any new technique for clandestine intrusion upon indi-
186. See text accompanying notes 41-47 supra.
187. Sullivan, Wiretapping and Eavesdropping: A Review of the Current Law, 18
HASTINGS L.J. 59, 60 (1966). See THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, Supra
note 168, at 200-01. "'The marked acceleration in technological developments and
sophistication in their use have resulted in new techniques for the planning, commission,
and concealment of criminal activities. It would be contrary to the public interest for
Government to deny to itself the prudent and lawful employment of those very
techniques which are employed against the Government and its law-abiding citizens."
United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 312 (1972).
188. Consider a California police chief's justification for the use of television in law
enforcement insofar as it might apply specifically to electronic snooping: "Throughout
the years, it has traditionally been the criminal who has first taken advantage of
technological advances . . . . The automobile and the two-way radio are prime exam-
ples; law-breakers were the first to employ them, and the police then adopted their use in
self-defense. But now police departments are taking the offensive in moving into new
areas before the law-breakers. Our own use of closed-circuit television as an important
law enforcement tool is a step forward in this direction. We're learning to use CCTV
extensively to enforce the law before someone figures out a way to break the law with
it." O'Brion, VTR: New Lawman, INDUSTRIAL PHOTOGRAPHY, Nov. 1971, at 26 (em-
phasis added).
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vidual privacy to say that it should be used merely because it is available
and is an easier or more convenient way to gather evidence of crime.189
The only remaining justification for electronic snooping seems to
be that it would provide a videotape of a defendant's activities which, as
a piece of physical evidence at a criminal trial, might have considerable
influence on a jury. In addition to an informer's or undercover agent's
testimony, physical evidence that has been seized, and the defendant's
own words intercepted by a wiretap or bug, the jury could observe the
private acts of the defendant on television. However, this use of elec-
tronic snooping completely ignores the constitutional requirement that
conventional methods be inadequate to obtain the same or similar
evidence. The necessity requirement must not be read as permitting the
use of any technological improvement which produces more convincing
proof of the same facts provided by other methods.
The law enforcement justification for electronic snooping is there-
fore clearly no greater than that for electronic eavesdropping, and
indeed may be less compelling. Undoubtedly, however, the intrusion
upon personal privacy inherent in electronic snooping is considerably
greater than that resulting from electronic eavesdropping. A considera-
tion of all -the factors on both sides of the scales leads to the conclusion
that the present justification for electronic snooping does not outweigh
the degree of intrusion upon personal privacy occasioned by its use. By
Fourth Amendment standards, electronic snooping must therefore be
considered an unreasonable law enforcement tool under any circum-
stances.
VI. Conclusion
Prior to 1968 the propriety of legalized electronic eavesdropping
had been the subject of a long and heated national debate.'90 Against
claims of the need for electronic eavesdropping in the war against
sophisticated criminals.91 opponents of eavesdropping objected that "we
destroy exactly what we are seeking to preserve when we try to protect
189. "One must be careful to distinguish betweeen constraints on police conduct
which limit effective police enforcement and those constraints which merely make
effective police enforcement more burdensome.
... Duties of law enforcement officials are extremely demanding in a free society.
But that is as it should be. A policeman's job is easy only in a police state." People
v. Spinelli, 35 N.Y.2d 77, 81-82, 315 N.E.2d 792, 795, 358 N.Y.S.2d 743, 747-48 (1974).
190. See generally Symposium: The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: Reflec-
tions on The Eavesdroppers, 44- MINN. L. REv. 811 (1960).




democracy with essentially totalitarian tools."'1 92  The debate finally
resulted in a national consensus, expressed through the Congress, that
the usefulness of electronic eavesdropping in certain areas of law en-
forcement outweighed the risks resulting from its indiscriminate nature
and potential for abuse when it was permitted only under conditions of
strict judicial control.
Now, another technological development for surreptitious sur-
veillance of individuals has emerged. Electronic sno6ping carries the
threat that every physical act of an individual may be subject to observa-
tion by an unseen viewer through the medium of an electronic eye. If
allowed to go unexamined, the use of electronic snooping devices might
eventually become so widespread, as have the tools of electronic eaves-
dropping,193 that a true feeling of security from clandestine visual
intrusions may become a thing of the past.9 The psychological fact,
even if not the physical reality, would be the arrival of the world of
1984, because "'Nineteen Eighty-Four' is largely a state of mind; for
many, the appearance of repression has the impact of reality."'1 95 To-
day "anyone can protect himself against surveillance by. retiring to the
cellar, cloaking all the windows with thick caulking, turning off the
lights and remaining absolutely quiet."' 96 With the advent of electronic
192. Williams, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Defense Counsel's
View, 44 MINN. L. REv. 855, 856 (1960).
193. See, e.g., O'Toole, Harmonica Bugs, Cloaks, and Silver Boxes, HARPER'S
MAGAZINE, June 1975, at 36 (describing the current state of the art of some eavesdropping
devices); The Ways and Means of Bugging, TIME, May 28, 1973, at 28. Despite Title
III's ban on the advertisement and sale of eavesdropping devices, 18 U.S.C. § 2512
(1970), devices easily adapted to surreptitious listening are still freely advertised. See,
e.g., PLAYBOY, Nov. 1975, at 223: "MICRO MINI MIKE. WIRELESS. Among world's
smallest. Improved solid state design. Picks up and transmits most sounds without
wires through FM radio up to 300 ft. Use as mike, music amp., babysitter, burglar
alarm, hot line, etc. For fun, home and business. Batt. incl. Money back guar.....
Only $14.95 plus 50g Post and hdlg."
194. For example, because of his legal representation of politically sensitive causes,
Stanford Law Professor Anthony G. Amsterdam admits that he no longer has any actual
expectation of privacy in his private conversations. Amsterdam, supra note 75, at 384.
Justice Douglas wrote that he was "morally certain" that the Supreme Court conference
room had been bugged. Heutsche v. United States, 414 U.S. 898 (1973) (denial of bail
motion) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Representative Ronald V. Dellums of California re-
cently revealed that a wiretap of his Berkeley office phone was discovered in 1972 and
that he now operates under the assumption that both his Berkeley and Washington of-
fices are bugged. San Francisco Chronicle, Oct. 10, 1975, at 6, col. 1.
195. Miller, The Right of Privacy: Data Banks and Dossiers, in RoscoE POUND--
AMERICAN TRIAL LAWYERs FOUNDATION, ANNUAL CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN CON-
FERENCE ON ADVOCACY IN THE UNITED STATES, PRIVACY IN A FREE SOCIETY 72, 75
(1974).
196. Amsterdam, supra note 75, at 402.
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snooping, a person wishing to assure the privacy of his actions from
visual observation will have no absolute protection even by resort to
these extreme measures.
Fortunately, our society is presently in a position to deal effectively
with the problems posed by electronic snooping. We have experienced
the controversy over electronic eavesdropping and have observed the
results of the implementation of a strictly supervised system for its
limited use.19 7  We have also become aware of the technology of
electronic snooping while it is still in its infancy. Informed, effective
decisions are therefore possible. No currently available evidence indi-
cates that electronic snooping would fill a law enforcement need caused
by the inadequacy of other presently available investigative techniques.
Thus the considerations which prompted acceptance of electronic eaves-
dropping as a law enforcement tool are not present to justify the use of
electronic snooping even under restrictions similar to those imposed by
Title II. In balancing the legitimate needs of law enforcement against
the personal interests invaded, a court faced with a challenge to evidence
obtained by electronic snooping, whether or not authorized by court
order, should declare the technique unreasonable per se under the
Fourth Amendment.
The present conditions of rapid technological development demand
that the impact of new technology upon individual privacy be evaluated
and controlled before its use becomes widespread, for failure to do so
would eventually "dim the right [of privacy] almost to the point of
extinction." 9 8 Because considerable time may pass before judicial
consideration of electronic snooping, legislation should be enacted to
prohibit the use of electronic visual surveillance techniques when such
use intrudes upon an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy from
such surveillance. Strict enforcement and control procedures should be
included in the legislation. Only in this way will the citizen's right to
privacy be affirmatively asserted before electronic snooping technology
advances beyond manageable proportions.
The continuing evolution of highly sophisticated electronic devices
clearly demonstrates the dangers inherent in their automatic adaptation
to law enforcement use solely because of their availability. Those who
would utilize new methods of clandestine intrusion upon individual
privacy must bear the heavy burden of justification for such use. In the
197. For contrasting views on the results, compare Schwartz, Six Years of Tapping
and Bugging, 1 Civ. LM. REv. 26 (1974) with Cranwell, Judicial Fine-Tuning of
Electronic Surveillance, 6 SETON HALL L. REv. 225 (1975).
198. Hufstedler, supra note 13, at 550.
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case of electronic snooping this burden simply has not been met. The
farsighted words of Justice Brandeis, penned at a time when electronic
eavesdropping was similarly in its infancy, evoke the present danger:
Experience should teach us -to be most on our guard to protect
liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficent. Men born
to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty
by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insid-
ious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without under-
standing.1 99
199. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

